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    If, following Place and Smart's topic-neutral analysis, m... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Kripke's challenge to the mind-brain identity theory fails because it relies on a false assumption about our knowledge of brain events

    If, following Place and Smart's topic-neutral analysis, mental concepts describe functional-causal roles rather than intrinsic qualia, then 'pain' and 'C-fiber firing' can rigidly co-designate the same underlying physical state without modal residue.

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    Key Terms

    C-fiber firing(an example of a physical phenomenon being compared)
    The electrical activation of nerve fibers in your nervous system, often used as an example of a physical, brain-based process.
    Functional-causal roles(in philosophy of mind)
    The job something does in a system—like how 'pain' is defined by what causes it (injury), what it causes (avoidance behavior), and how it relates to other mental states.
    Intrinsic qualia(in philosophy of mind)
    The private, inner 'what it's like' quality of an experience—for example, the specific redness of seeing red or the particular hurt of pain, independent of any function it performs.
    Mental concepts(as used in philosophy of mind)
    Our everyday ideas about the mind and thoughts, like 'belief,' 'desire,' 'intention,' and 'consciousness' — the words we use to talk about what's going on inside people's heads.

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    Modal residue(in metaphysics)
    A leftover gap or difference between two things when you consider all possible scenarios—the idea that something could be true in one possible world but not another, leaving room for them to come apart.
    Place and Smart(as referenced in the philosophy of mind)
    Two philosophers (U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart) who argued in the 1950s-60s that mental states like thoughts and feelings are actually just physical brain processes, not something separate or mysterious.
    Rigidly co-designate(in philosophy of language and metaphysics)
    Two names or terms that refer to exactly the same thing in every possible situation—like how 'water' and 'H₂O' always refer to the same substance, no matter what.
    topic-neutral analysis(Philosophy of mind, identity theory of mind)
    An analysis of sensation reports that does not presuppose either a physical or a mental vocabulary, remaining neutral between physicalist and non-physicalist interpretations, in the way that arithmetic is neutral between physical and mental domains

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    Consciousness & Mind1 linked

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