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    Kripke's challenge to the mind-brain identity theory fail... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
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    Kripke's challenge to the mind-brain identity theory fails because it relies on a false assumption about our knowledge of brain events

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's modal argument assumes pain's phenomenal essence is fully transparent to introspection, but introspection is a fallible and theory-laden cognitive process.
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    • 2.If introspective reports underdetermine the true nature of pain states, the apparent conceivability of pain without C-fiber firing may reflect epistemic limits, not genuine metaphysical possibility.
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    • 3.Russellian monism provides a principled explanation: phenomenal properties are the categorical bases of physical dispositions, dissolving the explanatory gap Kripke exploits.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke treats 'pain' as a rigid designator picking out a purely phenomenal property, but this presupposes a Cartesian conception of mental properties that is independently contested.
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    • 2.If, following Place and Smart's topic-neutral analysis, mental concepts describe functional-causal roles rather than intrinsic qualia, then 'pain' and 'C-fiber firing' can rigidly co-designate the same underlying physical state without modal residue.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Kripke's challenge assumes that we know from common sense, physics, and neurophysiology what brain events are like
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    • 2.Those sources only tell us about structural properties of brain events, not their underlying non-structural properties
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    • 3.Therefore, the assumption Kripke's challenge relies on is false
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Key Terms

    knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
    Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.

    Connections

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    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    If introspective reports underdetermine the true nature of pain states, the appa...If, following Place and Smart's topic-neutral analysis, mental concepts describe...Kripke treats 'pain' as a rigid designator picking out a purely phenomenal prope...Kripke's challenge assumes that we know from common sense, physics, and neurophy...
    +4 moreShow less
    Kripke's modal argument assumes pain's phenomenal essence is fully transparent t...

    Similar

    The mind-brain identity theory can be established without relying on p...84%Dualistic theories and mind-brain identity theories do not tie mental ...82%Token-identity theory holds that mental events are identical to physic...81%The mind-brain identity theory is preferable to dualism78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: russellian-monism
    View source passageHide passage
    In the late twentieth century, Grover Maxwell (1978) and Michael Lockwood (1989, 1992) each endorse a theory that they attribute to Russell and is often interpreted as Russellian monism (see, for example, Chalmers 1996, 2013). Maxwell presents his theory in the course of defending the mind-brain identity theory (Place 1956; Smart 1959; Lewis 1966; see the entry the mind/brain identity theory) against Saul Kripke’s (1972) influential challenge. Kripke’s challenge concerns how to reconcile that
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Russellian monism provides a principled explanation: phenomenal properties are t...
    Therefore, the assumption Kripke's challenge relies on is false
    Those sources only tell us about structural properties of brain events, not thei...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit