If identity between a proposition and a fact is truth-constituting by necessity (as Frege-inspired identity theorists hold), then no false proposition can coherently be said to be identical with any fact, making P1 vacuously false.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
A philosopher who believes that truth works by having propositions be identical with facts—that a true statement is literally the same thing as the fact it describes.
P1(Premise establishing that self-subsistent entities are not immanent in humans.)
Nothing that is itself by itself is in humans.
Truth-constituting(in theories of truth)
The idea that something actually creates or makes something else be true, rather than just describing it.
Vacuously false(in logic)
False in a kind of technical way where the whole statement becomes meaningless or empty because its conditions can never be met.
fact(Armstrong/Mellor's account of facts as truth-makers)
A fundamental entity consisting in objects, properties and relations bound together, posited to serve as truth-maker for contingent atomic predications
proposition(Used in the context of a semantic theory sensitive to differences in subject matter.)
The content expressed by a sentence, individuated at least in part by the subject matter of the sentence and the contents of its subsentential expressions.