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    On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p b... — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p being identical with a fact does not suffice to render the proposition true.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p is identical with a fact — at the very least with itself.
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    • 2.Given the failure of (a), the identity theorist can contend that that fact is the wrong fact.
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    • 3.Identity with the wrong fact does not make a proposition true.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.For the identity theorist (McDowell, Dodd), a true proposition just is a fact, so 'wrong fact' presupposes an impossible identity between falsehood and fact.
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    • 2.If false propositions cannot be identical with facts by definition, the Wittgensteinian line conflates propositional content with factual constitution, undermining P1's concession.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's context principle entails that propositional sense is individuated by truth-conditions, so a false proposition and a fact cannot share identity conditions at all.
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    • 2.If identity between a proposition and a fact is truth-constituting by necessity (as Frege-inspired identity theorists hold), then no false proposition can coherently be said to be identical with any fact, making P1 vacuously false.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    For the identity theorist (McDowell, Dodd), a true proposition just is a fact, s...Frege's context principle entails that propositional sense is individuated by tr...Given the failure of (a), the identity theorist can contend that that fact is th...Identity with the wrong fact does not make a proposition true.
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    If false propositions cannot be identical with facts by definition, the Wittgens...If identity between a proposition and a fact is truth-constituting by necessity ...On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p is identical with a fact...

    Similar

    On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p is identical w...97%If propositions are facts (in Wittgensteinian spirit), then the propos...88%Saying that a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fact ...87%A false proposition is still identical with itself87%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truth-identity
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    Falsity, it seems, now no longer presents a difficulty, because if it is false that p then it is not a fact that p, so that (a) fails, and there is no appropriate candidate for the proposition that p to be identical with.[13] Notice that, in view of the considerations already aired in connection with the modal problem ((i) of this section), caution is here required. Suppose that it is true that p in the actual world, but false in some other possible world. According to the strategy that we hav
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit