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    If misframing were the mechanism, cooperation rates would... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Experimental subjects in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma settings initially cooperate because they treat the game as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

    If misframing were the mechanism, cooperation rates would drop to near-zero once subjects are corrected—but they do not fall to Nash equilibrium predictions.

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    Reasons For

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    • 1.Subjects possess stable cooperative preferences independent of frame; correction removes cognitive obstacle but not underlying motivation.
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    • 2.Nash equilibrium assumes rational self-interest; persistent cooperation suggests subjects value fairness or reciprocity as terminal values.
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    • 3.Cooperative norms are deeply internalized; brief reframing cannot override social preferences formed through years of cultural conditioning.
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    Reasons Against

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    • 1.Subjects may reframe again post-correction using alternative interpretations, maintaining cooperation without reverting to initial misunderstanding.
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    • 2.Dropout or demand effects could mask actual defection; those who remain cooperative after correction may be unrepresentative sample.
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    • 3.Near-zero predictions assume pure Nash play, but human baseline behavior typically exceeds theory; correction may not change cooperation relative to baseline.
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    Cooperative norms are deeply internalized; brief reframing cannot override socia...Dropout or demand effects could mask actual defection; those who remain cooperat...Experimental subjects in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma settings initially cooperat...Nash equilibrium assumes rational self-interest; persistent cooperation suggests...
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    Near-zero predictions assume pure Nash play, but human baseline behavior typical...Subjects may reframe again post-correction using alternative interpretations, ma...Subjects possess stable cooperative preferences independent of frame; correction...

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