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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Experimental subjects in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma sett... — Carmelics
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    Home/Causation
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    Experimental subjects in one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma settings initially cooperate because they treat the game as a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

    CausationTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.People rarely encounter one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas in everyday life but frequently encounter repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas with non-strangers
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    • 2.Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas have many Nash equilibria that involve cooperation rather than defection
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    • 3.People apply strategies learned from repeated games when placed into a structurally similar one-shot game
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Subjects cooperate in one-shot PD even when framing and instructions explicitly exclude repeated-game reasoning, as Andreoni (1995) demonstrated.
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    • 2.If misframing were the mechanism, cooperation rates would drop to near-zero once subjects are corrected—but they do not fall to Nash equilibrium predictions.
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    • 3.A residual cooperative disposition that persists after correction requires explanation by social preferences or moral norms, not strategic misclassification.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Evolutionary and cultural selection pressures instill unconditional prosocial dispositions, not merely context-sensitive repeated-game strategies, as Sober and Wilson argue in 'Unto Others'.
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    • 2.Genuine altruistic or fairness-based preferences explain cooperation without positing an error in game categorization, making the misframing hypothesis explanatorily redundant under Occam's Razor.
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    Related

    A residual cooperative disposition that persists after correction requires expla...Evolutionary and cultural selection pressures instill unconditional prosocial di...Genuine altruistic or fairness-based preferences explain cooperation without pos...If misframing were the mechanism, cooperation rates would drop to near-zero once...
    +4 moreShow less
    People apply strategies learned from repeated games when placed into a structura...People rarely encounter one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas in everyday life but freque...Repeated Prisoner's Dilemmas have many Nash equilibria that involve cooperation ...Subjects cooperate in one-shot PD even when framing and instructions explicitly ...

    Similar

    Subjects initially cooperate in laboratory one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma...83%People apply strategies learned from repeated games when placed into a...78%Human game players will often or usually avoid framing situations in s...77%People rarely encounter one-shot Prisoner's Dilemmas in everyday life ...75%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    The paradox of backward induction, like the puzzles raised by equilibrium refinement, is mainly a problem for those who view game theory as contributing to a normative theory of rationality (specifically, as contributing to that larger theory the theory of strategic rationality). The non-psychological game theorist can give a different sort of account of apparently “irrational” play and the prudence it encourages. This involves appeal to the empirical fact that actual agents, including people, m
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit