If moral judgments are normally combinations of belief, emotion, and motivation, but are sometimes just beliefs and sometimes just emotional and motivational responses, then premises (1), (2), and (3) and the possibility of moral knowledge can all be accepted
An episode of interrelated, synchronized changes in the states of all or most of the five organismic subsystems in response to the evaluation of an external or internal stimulus event as relevant to major concerns of the organism.
knowledge(Distinguished from mere true belief, which may be the product of indoctrination and need not exercise deliberative capacities.)
Justified true belief — true belief that has been arrived at through the exercise of deliberative capacities, including comparison of and deliberation among alternatives.
moral judgments(as used in ethics)
Decisions or conclusions about what is right, wrong, good, or bad—like deciding whether lying is acceptable or if helping others is important.
moral knowledge(Used to argue that moral anti-realism precludes genuine moral knowledge)
Knowledge of objective moral truths, which requires the existence of objective moral properties
premises(as used in logic and philosophical arguments)
Starting statements or assumptions that are used to support a conclusion—like the opening claims in an argument that lead to a final point.
The hybrid conception of moral judgment is not inconsistent with premise (1), if we are prepared to interpret it as implying only that for moral knowledge to be possible moral judgments are sometimes (true) beliefs, not that they are always nothing but beliefs. Recall premise (1): If moral knowledge is possible, then our moral judgments are beliefs. If moral judgments are normally combinations of belief, emotion, and motivation, but are sometimes just beliefs and sometimes just emotional and mot