One can accept that moral judgments can be true without denying that moral judgments normally motivate directly or implying that moral beliefs sometimes motivate directly independently of antecedent desires
Your personal convictions about what is right and wrong, good and bad.
Motivate directly(describing how moral judgments might influence behavior)
To cause someone to want to act on something immediately, without needing anything else to push them into action.
Truth value (that moral judgments can be true)(describing whether moral judgments are fact-like)
The idea that moral statements can be objectively correct or incorrect, the same way factual statements like 'water boils at 100°C' can be true or false.
moral judgments(as used in ethics)
Decisions or conclusions about what is right, wrong, good, or bad—like deciding whether lying is acceptable or if helping others is important.
motivational internalism(As applied by error theorists to moral claims, extended here by analogy to pain claims)
The view that the truth of certain claims (e.g., moral claims) requires or entails intrinsically motivating states
The hybrid conception of moral judgment is not inconsistent with premise (1), if we are prepared to interpret it as implying only that for moral knowledge to be possible moral judgments are sometimes (true) beliefs, not that they are always nothing but beliefs. Recall premise (1): If moral knowledge is possible, then our moral judgments are beliefs. If moral judgments are normally combinations of belief, emotion, and motivation, but are sometimes just beliefs and sometimes just emotional and mot