If no representation ever genuinely 'stands still' in consciousness, the mechanical equilibrium Herbart describes has no phenomenological referent and the compression feeling lacks a subject.
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Phenomenological referent(in debates about consciousness and mental states)
An actual conscious experience that something corresponds to; without this, a concept has no real experiential basis in someone's mind.
consciousness(Philosophy of mind; framing the 'What is consciousness?' question)
A dynamic process characterized by self-transforming flow, intentional coherence, and semantic self-understanding, rather than a static or momentary state.
representation(Schopenhauer's Kantian framework; the empirical/phenomenal side of reality)
The world as it appears to a knowing subject; objects as they are given through the subject's cognitive forms
subject(Logical/grammatical ontology in Eisagoge)
Either a sound signifying a meaning or a meaning signified by a certain sound