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    If normative reasons were true propositions, the 'wrong k... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Normative reasons are not true propositions.

    If normative reasons were true propositions, the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen) would be unresolvable, since propositions lack the evaluative directionality reasons require.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Propositions are truth-apt abstract objects with no intrinsic causal or motivational force on agents.
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    • 2.The wrong-kind-of-reason problem requires distinguishing reasons that genuinely justify from those that merely explain belief.
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    • 3.Only entities with evaluative directionality (intrinsic 'for-ness') can solve this distinction without collapsing into psychologism.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Propositions can express evaluative content (e.g., 'X is good') without themselves possessing directionality as objects.
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    • 2.The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is solvable via propositional content conditions that specify appropriate response-dependence relations.
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    • 3.Attributing directionality to reasons risks hypostatizing psychological attitudes, making reasons metaphysically obscure rather than clearer.
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    Key Terms

    Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen(in 21st-century analytic philosophy)
    Two contemporary philosophers who studied moral reasons and helped identify the 'wrong kind of reason' problem.
    evaluative directionality(in ethics)
    The quality of pointing toward or guiding us toward what's valuable or good—reasons have a direction that aims at what matters morally.
    normative reasons(Philosophy of action, reasons internalism debate)
    Reasons that bear on what an agent ought to do; on one view, understood in terms of explanatory/motivating reasons
    true propositions(in metaphysics and logic)
    Statements that accurately describe reality, like 'water boils at 100 degrees Celsius' is a true proposition.
    unresolvable(the dilemma in Kant's theory can't be resolved)
    Unable to be solved or fixed; the problem can't be overcome within the existing framework.
    wrong kind of reason problem(Central challenge for all FA theories)
    The problem of identifying which considerations for or against evaluative attitudes are relevant to the value of their objects, as opposed to other kinds of reasons for holding those attitudes.

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Attributing directionality to reasons risks hypostatizing psychological attitude...Normative reasons are not true propositions.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Only entities with evaluative directionality (intrinsic 'for-ness') can solve th...
    Propositions are truth-apt abstract objects with no intrinsic causal or motivati...
    +3 moreShow less
    Propositions can express evaluative content (e.g., 'X is good') without themselv...The wrong-kind-of-reason problem is solvable via propositional content condition...The wrong-kind-of-reason problem requires distinguishing reasons that genuinely ...