If one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates, then any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases.
A style of philosophy that tries to solve problems by breaking them down into smaller parts and examining them carefully, often using logic and language.
behaviorism
The view that there is no more to having mental states than being disposed to behave in certain ways.
functionalism(Philosophy of mind; distinguished here from representationalism)
The view that mental states are defined by the causal roles they play in a cognitive system — their actual, potential, or typical causal relationships.
mental predicates(the main subject being analyzed in the statement)
Words or phrases we use to describe mental states, like 'believes,' 'desires,' 'feels happy,' or 'is conscious.'
Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not