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    The mind has no more than causal ontological dependence o... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body (not logical or analytic dependence).

    Consciousness & MindModality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case against stronger forms of mind-body dependence.
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    • 2.If one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates, then any necessary dependence of mind on body does not follow the model that applies in other scientific cases.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's a posteriori necessity shows that identity statements like 'pain = C-fiber firing' are necessarily true if true at all.
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    • 2.If mind-brain identity holds necessarily rather than contingently, the mind's dependence on the body is stronger than mere causal dependence.
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    • 3.The conceivability of disembodied minds may reflect epistemic gaps rather than genuine metaphysical possibility, undermining the conceivability argument's force.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Grounding relations, as developed by Fine and Schaffer, constitute a form of non-causal, non-analytic ontological dependence distinct from logical entailment.
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    • 2.If phenomenal properties are grounded in physical properties, the mind depends on the body via a necessary metaphysical relation that exceeds mere causal dependence without requiring analytic reduction.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityConsciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Philosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    Grounding relations, as developed by Fine and Schaffer, constitute a form of non...If mind-brain identity holds necessarily rather than contingently, the mind's de...If one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental pre...If phenomenal properties are grounded in physical properties, the mind depends o...
    +3 moreShow less
    Kripke's a posteriori necessity shows that identity statements like 'pain = C-fi...The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case against stronger forms of...The conceivability of disembodied minds may reflect epistemic gaps rather than g...

    Similar

    The simplest account of mind-dependence — that a thing is mind-depende...85%The first account of mind-dependence — requiring the object to be the ...82%On the simplest account, a thing is mind-dependent if it would not or ...82%The dependence of biological entities on physical entities does not im...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: dualism
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    Because ‘thickness’ always leaves room for dispute, this is one of those cases in philosophy in which one is at the mercy of the arguments philosophers happen to think up. The conceivability argument creates a prima facie case for thinking that mind has no more than causal ontological dependence on the body. Let us assume that one rejects analytical (behaviourist or functionalist) accounts of mental predicates. Then the above arguments show that any necessary dependence of mind on body does not
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit