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    If p is false, the true belief that not-p can be added to... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Condition (3) prevents a belief from being infallible despite meeting condition (2) when p is false

    If p is false, the true belief that not-p can be added to the subject's belief system

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    Adding the true belief that not-p to the subject's belief system reduces the war...Condition (3) prevents a belief from being infallible despite meeting condition ...Therefore a false belief cannot satisfy condition (3)

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    Sincere avowal that p does not entail belief that p87%Suppose the proposition that p is false87%Adding the true belief that not-p to the subject's belief system reduc...87%It would be wrong to say that, in a possible world where it is false t...85%

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    Klein says that the second condition is what makes the belief subjectively immune to doubt, presumably because it is the beliefs and experiences that constitute S’s subjective perspective that render her warranted in denying all propositions that would reduce the warrant for p. However, S’s belief system might contain false beliefs that could warrant her in denying every g relevant to p—even, in some cases, where the g in question is itself true—and so her belief that p might meet condition (2)

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