If phenomenal concept reference is essentially indexical and non-descriptive, then the gap between conceptual and metaphysical possibility that Kripke identifies for natural kinds and persons does not generalize to phenomenal properties.
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indexical(Used to explain how 'the second-largest city in the United States' can refer to Chicago when embedded under a past-tense temporal operator)
An expression whose reference depends on the context of utterance
metaphysical possibility(Distinguished from mathematical possibility to argue that some mathematically consistent results are ruled out by the nature of concrete reality)
What is possible in the concrete world, which is a more restrictive domain than mathematical possibility
natural kinds(Water is offered as a paradigm example of a natural kind individuated by microstructure)
Categories of things in nature that share an essential microstructure, used to ground essentialism about species and substances
phenomenal concept(May be discursive, demonstrative, or more direct.)
A concept whose denotation is a phenomenal property.
phenomenal properties(Used in the context of higher-order thought theory to refer to properties whose presence is explained by higher-order representations)
The qualitative, 'what-it-is-like' features of conscious experience that characterize how perceptual states feel to the subject