If phenomenal facts are not entailed a priori by physical facts, reductive physicalism fails even granting metaphysical supervenience, as Chalmers' two-dimensional semantics shows.

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Chalmers: # Chalmers David Chalmers is a prominent Australian philosopher known for introducing the concept of "the hard problem of consciousness"—the question of why and how physical processes in the brain create subjective experiences like the feeling of pain or the color red. His work challenges the assumption that science can easily explain consciousness and has become central to modern debates about the mind and human experience. He matters because he fundamentally shaped how philosophers and scientists think about what makes consciousness uniquely difficult to understand.
Physical facts(as facts that fictionalists accept as real): Truths about the material world—things like 'water boils at 100 degrees Celsius' or 'atoms have electrons'—that can be measured and tested.
entailed a priori(in epistemology and logic): Can be logically proven or figured out just by thinking about it, without needing to do experiments or observe the world.
metaphysical supervenience(The zombie argument targets this supervenience relation to undermine physicalist reduction.)

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