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    The project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    The project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed to failure.

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The explanatory gap between physical descriptions and phenomenal experience is not merely epistemic but reflects an ontological asymmetry in nature.
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    • 2.Levine's explanatory gap argument shows that even complete physical knowledge leaves unexplained why neural states feel like anything at all.
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    • 3.Any successful reduction must eliminate the explanandum, but phenomenal consciousness cannot be eliminated without changing the subject entirely.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Jackson's Mary argument demonstrates that complete physical knowledge is epistemically incomplete with respect to qualia, suggesting physical facts underdetermine phenomenal facts.
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    • 2.If phenomenal facts are not entailed a priori by physical facts, reductive physicalism fails even granting metaphysical supervenience, as Chalmers' two-dimensional semantics shows.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties, then no reduction of phenomenal properties to physical properties is possible.
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    • 2.Chalmers' zombie argument, if successful, shows that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility2 linked

    Related

    Any successful reduction must eliminate the explanandum, but phenomenal consciou...Chalmers' zombie argument, if successful, shows that phenomenal properties do no...If phenomenal facts are not entailed a priori by physical facts, reductive physi...If phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties,...
    +3 moreShow less
    Jackson's Mary argument demonstrates that complete physical knowledge is epistem...Levine's explanatory gap argument shows that even complete physical knowledge le...The explanatory gap between physical descriptions and phenomenal experience is n...

    Similar

    If phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical p...84%The revised Via Negativa — defining a physical property as one that is...77%Davidson holds that mental properties weakly supervene on physical pro...75%Kim argues that 'minimal physicalism' requires that mental properties ...74%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: supervenience
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    Another argument by appeal to a FIST is Chalmers’ appeal to the (putative) metaphysical possibility of zombies (see Section 3.1 and Section 5.4). This is intended to show that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on, and thus do not reduce to, physical properties. This line of argument is available even though physicalists have not yet proposed any such reduction. If it succeeds, then the project of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed to failure.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit