Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    If predicates refer via causal chains rather than descrip... — Carmelics
    Home
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Challenges→There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic property of X-ness

    If predicates refer via causal chains rather than descriptive meaning, 'good' could rigidly designate a naturalistic property even if its meaning differs from naturalistic predicates.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Key Terms

    Causal chains(as used in philosophy of causation)
    A sequence of events where each one is caused by the previous one, like dominoes falling in a line.
    Naturalistic property(as the type of property Moore says can't equal goodness)
    A characteristic or quality that can be described using natural science—like physical properties (color, weight) or psychological facts (pleasure, desire).
    Predicates(in logic and philosophy of language)
    Words or phrases that describe properties or characteristics of something—like 'is red' or 'is tall' in the sentence 'The ball is red.'
    Refer/reference(both uses of 'this' refer to (point to) the same ship, even though they point at different parts)
    When a word or phrase points to or stands for something in the real world.
    Rigidly designate

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Explore a random proposition
    Start fresh with something unrelated.
    (philosophy of language)
    A term that always picks out the same specific thing no matter what situation or scenario you're imagining—like how 'George Washington' always refers to the same person even in hypothetical situations.
    descriptive meaning(Stevenson's emotivist theory of ethical language)
    The factual or cognitive content associated with an ethical term, which Stevenson held may be merely suggested rather than strictly designated

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

    Related

    There is a property of goodness that is not identical to any naturalistic proper...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective