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    Made withinDC&Austin
    If propositions have properties as components, those prop... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    If propositions have properties as components, those properties must be transcendent, platonist properties rather than immanent properties.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Propositions can have properties as components that are not instantiated in the physical world.
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    • 2.Immanent-realist properties exist only in physical things that instantiate them.
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    • 3.Therefore, immanent-realist properties cannot serve as components of all propositions.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Immanent realism can be extended to include dispositional or possible instantiation, not merely actual instantiation (following Armstrong's combinatorialism).
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    • 2.A property that is possibly but not actually instantiated can still serve as a proposition component without requiring transcendent Platonic status.
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    • 3.The inference from 'not instantiated in the physical world' to 'must be transcendent' illicitly conflates absence of actual instantiation with absence of immanent ontological grounding.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nominalist and neo-Fregean accounts (Hale and Wright) reconstruct property-talk via abstraction principles without commitment to transcendent entities.
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    • 2.If propositions are individuated through their inferential roles rather than through substantial property-components, the argument's premise P1 loses its ontological bite.
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    • 3.The assumption that propositions have 'components' in a metaphysically robust sense begs the question against deflationary and neo-Fregean accounts of propositional structure.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    A property that is possibly but not actually instantiated can still serve as a p...If propositions are individuated through their inferential roles rather than thr...Immanent realism can be extended to include dispositional or possible instantiat...Immanent-realist properties exist only in physical things that instantiate them.
    +6 moreShow less
    Nominalist and neo-Fregean accounts (Hale and Wright) reconstruct property-talk ...Propositions can have properties as components that are not instantiated in the ...The assumption that propositions have 'components' in a metaphysically robust se...The inference from 'not instantiated in the physical world' to 'must be transcen...The only remaining option is that the properties composing propositions are tran...Therefore, immanent-realist properties cannot serve as components of all proposi...

    Similar

    The only remaining option is that the properties composing proposition...93%A platonistic view of properties and relations can be motivated by the...90%Therefore, immanent-realist properties cannot serve as components of a...86%Therefore, propositions cannot be made up of properties that exist in ...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: platonism
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    It is worth noting that platonists who argue for properties and relations in conjunction with propositions — i.e., by first arguing for propositions and then claiming that properties and relations are components of propositions — will have an easier time arguing that properties and relations couldn't exist in our minds (as conceptualists say) or in things (as immanent realists say). In connection with conceptualism, platonists of this sort could claim that the argument given in section 4.2 for
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit