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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If propositions have properties as components, those properties must be transcendent, platonist properties rather than immanent properties.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Immanent realism can be extended to include dispositional or possible instantiation, not merely actual instantiation (following Armstrong's combinatorialism).
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    • 2.A property that is possibly but not actually instantiated can still serve as a proposition component without requiring transcendent Platonic status.
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    • 3.The inference from 'not instantiated in the physical world' to 'must be transcendent' illicitly conflates absence of actual instantiation with absence of immanent ontological grounding.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Nominalist and neo-Fregean accounts (Hale and Wright) reconstruct property-talk via abstraction principles without commitment to transcendent entities.
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    • 2.If propositions are individuated through their inferential roles rather than through substantial property-components, the argument's premise P1 loses its ontological bite.
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    • 3.The assumption that propositions have 'components' in a metaphysically robust sense begs the question against deflationary and neo-Fregean accounts of propositional structure.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Propositions can have properties as components that are not instantiated in the physical world.
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    • 2.Immanent-realist properties exist only in physical things that instantiate them.
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    • 3.Therefore, immanent-realist properties cannot serve as components of all propositions.
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