If reasons internalism derives its justification from the explanatory power of the claim that reasons depend on desire or motivation, then desire or motivation must consistently generate reasons
The capacity of a defining feature to explain why instances of the thing defined have that property (e.g., why reverent people or actions are reverent).
justification(Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge)
The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.
reasons internalism(Bernard Williams (1979))
The view that in order to have a normative reason to act, an agent must have some motive that will be furthered by so acting
A related objection consists in the complaint that agents can have desires that clearly do not generate any practical reasons because they are for worthless objects. Prominent examples in the literature include a desire to drink a saucer of mud or a can of paint, and a disposition to turn on radios whenever they are off. As noted in section 3.1.3, these examples can’t provide direct counterexamples to any sort of reasons internalism, because reasons internalism itself places only a necessary con