If relations of origin suffice to individuate Persons within one numerically identical substance, the claim that distinct particular substances are required for coherent consubstantiality is defeated.

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1 reason for

1 reason against

Reasons For

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Reason for

1.Relations of origin (e.g., procession) successfully individuate the three persons within the Christian Trinity despite numerical substance identity.
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2.If internal relational distinctions suffice for personhood within one substance, separate substances become metaphysically redundant and violate parsimony.
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3.Consubstantiality requires only shared essential nature, not numerically distinct substrates; relational individuation is compatible with this requirement.
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Reasons Against

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Reason against

1.Relations of origin may individuate persons but do not constitute the metaphysical basis for their subsistence as distinct particulars within substance.
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2.Distinct particular substances provide irreducible ontological grounding that relational properties alone cannot supply for genuine consubstantiality.
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3.Assuming relations suffice risks collapsing personhood into mere modal or accidental distinctions, undermining substantive claims about divine persons.
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Key Terms

Individuate(metaphysics): To identify or distinguish something as a separate, individual thing with its own unique identity.
Numerically identical(as used to describe whether two agents are the exact same person): Being literally the same thing, not just similar or alike—like how the person you are today is numerically identical to the person you were yesterday (one and the same individual).
Particular substances(examples of what Aristotle studied in metaphysics): Individual, concrete things that exist in the world—like a specific cat, dog, or person. They're 'particular' because they're one specific thing rather than a general category.
consubstantiality(Trinitarian theology; Nicene formula): The property of sharing the same substance or nature. Philoponus argues that consubstantiality only makes sense if applied to three distinct particular substances that each instantiate a shared universal nature
persons(Metaphysical units in reductionism): Psychological units constituted by psychological continuity over time, serving as the basic moral units under Parfit's Moderate Claim.
relations of origin(metaphysics/theology): The connections between things based on where they come from or how they were created; in this case, who or what caused a person to exist.
substance(Spinoza's metaphysics; criteria include (i) necessity and (ii) self-subsistence): The fundamental existent that is wholly necessary and self-subsistent, not depending on anything else for its existence

Connections

2 topics

Trinity1 linked Divine Attributes1 linked

Assuming relations suffice risks collapsing personhood into mere modal or accide...Consubstantiality requires only shared essential nature, not numerically distinc...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 2 (1 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit