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    If S uses "green" to mean green, S incurs a commitment to... — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    If S uses "green" to mean green, S incurs a commitment to use the term accordingly.

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Meaning statements are true in virtue of a rule-governed practice
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    • 2.By using a term with a given meaning, S becomes a participant in that practice
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    • 3.Participation in a rule-governed practice entails incurring commitments associated with that practice
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's Wittgenstein shows any past use is compatible with infinitely many rules, so no determinate commitment can be derived from use alone.
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    • 2.Without a fact that fixes which rule S follows, the normative commitment lacks a determinate content to bind S to.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Williamson argues meaning-constitutive norms are epistemic rather than semantic, so using 'green' commits S only to asserting what S knows, not to use conditions.
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    • 2.If the commitment is epistemic rather than semantic, participation in linguistic practice does not itself generate use-based obligations of the kind the claim describes.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of Language

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

    Related

    By using a term with a given meaning, S becomes a participant in that practiceIf the commitment is epistemic rather than semantic, participation in linguistic...Kripke's Wittgenstein shows any past use is compatible with infinitely many rule...Meaning statements are true in virtue of a rule-governed practice
    +3 moreShow less
    Participation in a rule-governed practice entails incurring commitments associat...Williamson argues meaning-constitutive norms are epistemic rather than semantic,...Without a fact that fixes which rule S follows, the normative commitment lacks a...

    Similar

    If 'green' means green for S, then S ought to use 'green' in accordanc...94%The intuition to be captured is that meaning green by "green" obligate...90%It is not an objection to meaning-engendered (ME) normativity that the...84%Meaning statements like "'Green' means green" are true in virtue of th...84%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning-normativity
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    In response it has been suggested that the relevant normative consequences should not be understood in terms of obligations but, rather, in terms of commitments. This is the line taken by Alan Millar (2002 and 2004). Meaning statements, such as “‘Green’ means green”, Millar argues, are true in virtue of there being a rule-governed practice. If \(S\) uses “green” to mean green, therefore, she becomes a participant in this practice and incurs a commitment to use the term accordingly. To be properl
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit