Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    It is not an objection to meaning-engendered (ME) normati... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    It is not an objection to meaning-engendered (ME) normativity that there are situations in which "green" means green for S without S being obligated to apply "green" only to green objects.

    Philosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Semantic obligations are merely prima facie.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Prima facie obligations may be overridden by other obligations (such as the obligation in a certain context to tell a lie).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If semantic obligations are merely prima facie, they presuppose a normative framework prior to meaning that determines when they are overridden.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A normative framework prior to and independent of meaning cannot itself be grounded in meaning, undermining ME normativity's foundational claim.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Therefore, ME normativity cannot explain normativity without presupposing an unexplained normative background, making it explanatorily circular.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's rule-following considerations show that no fact about past usage determines a unique correct application of any term.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If no fact fixes what 'green' means for S, then no genuine obligation to apply 'green' only to green objects can be derived from meaning alone.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The prima facie/pro tanto distinction cannot rescue ME normativity if the underlying semantic fact generating the obligation is itself indeterminate.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityPhilosophy of Language

    Key Terms

    Meaning-engendered (ME) normativity(as used in philosophy of language and semantics)
    The idea that the meaning of a word creates rules or obligations about how we should use it—for example, if 'green' means the color green, then normativity would say we're obligated to only call green things 'green'.
    Objection (in philosophy)(as used in philosophical argumentation)
    A challenge or counterargument that tries to show a theory or claim is wrong or has a flaw.
    S (in formal philosophy)(as used in formal philosophical notation)
    A shorthand letter used to represent 'a subject' or 'a person'—it's just a placeholder, like using 'X' in algebra.
    normativity(Explained via rational willing in the Kantian framework)
    The property of norms that makes them requirements incumbent on all agents.
    obligation(Within obligational disputation)
    The respondent's commitment to a specific stance on the case put forward by the opponent, which governs how the respondent must respond to subsequent propositions throughout the disputation.

    Related

    A normative framework prior to and independent of meaning cannot itself be groun...If no fact fixes what 'green' means for S, then no genuine obligation to apply '...If semantic obligations are merely prima facie, they presuppose a normative fram...Kripke's rule-following considerations show that no fact about past usage determ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Prima facie obligations may be overridden by other obligations (such as the obli...Semantic obligations are merely prima facie.

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning-normativity
    View source passageHide passage
    Another strand in the discussion of the simple argument concerns the status of the relevant semantic obligations. Here it is often emphasized that semantic obligations are merely prima facie and may be overridden by other obligations, such as the obligation (in a certain context) to tell a lie. It is therefore not an objection to ME normativity that there are situations in which “green” means green for \(S\), without it being the case that \(S\) ought to apply “green” to green objects only (Whit
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The prima facie/pro tanto distinction cannot rescue ME normativity if the underl...
    Therefore, ME normativity cannot explain normativity without presupposing an une...

    Similar

    The intuition to be captured is that meaning green by "green" obligate...85%If 'green' means green for S, then S ought to use 'green' in accordanc...85%Meaning statements like "'Green' means green" are true in virtue of th...84%If S uses "green" to mean green, S incurs a commitment to use the term...84%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit