If scientific 'truths' rest on unjustified hinges (e.g., uniformity of nature) that are no more epistemically grounded than articles of faith, the distinction between conditional and unconditional acceptance is a difference of content, not epistemic kind.
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A normative enterprise that tells us how we ought to reason from evidence and how we ought to justify our beliefs, as distinct from merely describing how we do reason or justify beliefs
hinges(Wittgenstein's epistemology; from On Certainty)
Fundamental principles so basic that they do not require argumentative support and instead serve as the fixed points on which inquiry and reasoning turn.
unconditional acceptance(as used in epistemology)
Believing something completely and absolutely, without any doubts, conditions, or reservations.
uniformity of nature(Central presupposition in Hume's problem of induction)
The assumption that the future will resemble the past — i.e., that natural regularities observed historically will continue to hold — which is presupposed in all inductive knowledge but cannot be rationally grounded without circularity