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    If seemings are pre-conceptual, they lack the proposition... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→We must distinguish between perceiving that p (which entails p is true) and perceptual seemings (where p might be false)

    If seemings are pre-conceptual, they lack the propositional form needed to bear truth-values; if they are conceptual, they are already subject to the same fallibility as perceiving-that, collapsing the distinction.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Non-propositional states cannot be true or false, only accurate or inaccurate, preserving a real distinction from propositional judgment.
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    • 2.Conceptual content requires rational capacities and inferential roles that pre-conceptual seemings demonstrably lack empirically.
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    • 3.Collapsing seemings into perceiving-that eliminates the causal buffer explaining why seemings don't immediately constitute knowledge.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against
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    • 1.The accuracy/truth distinction is merely terminological; both require content matching reality, so the dilemma's terms are false.
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    • 2.Pre-conceptual states can still possess representational content without explicit concept-deployment, undermining the excluded-middle framing.
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    • 3.Some seemings (e.g., gestalt organization) are conceptually structured yet epistemically more basic than propositional judgments.
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    Key Terms

    Fallibility(as used in epistemology)
    The fact that something can be mistaken or wrong; the quality of being capable of error.
    Perceiving-that(as used in epistemology)
    The act of directly noticing something and understanding what it is—like seeing that the light is on, not just seeing redness without understanding it.
    Pre-conceptual(as used in epistemology)
    Happening before you use concepts or categories to understand something; raw experience that hasn't been labeled or organized by your thinking yet.
    Propositional form(Bolzano's doctrine of universal propositional structure)
    The structure '[A has b]', which Bolzano holds to be common to all propositions
    Truth-values(logic and semantics)
    Whether a statement is true or false—the two possible truth-values are 'true' and 'false.'
    seemings(Epistemology of perception and foundationalism)
    Non-belief perceptual or experiential states that play the epistemological role of conferring justification on basic beliefs without themselves requiring justification

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPerception1 linked

    Related

    Collapsing seemings into perceiving-that eliminates the causal buffer explaining...Conceptual content requires rational capacities and inferential roles that pre-c...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    Non-propositional states cannot be true or false, only accurate or inaccurate, p...
    Pre-conceptual states can still possess representational content without explici...
    +3 moreShow less
    Some seemings (e.g., gestalt organization) are conceptually structured yet epist...The accuracy/truth distinction is merely terminological; both require content ma...We must distinguish between perceiving that p (which entails p is true) and perc...