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    Carmelics

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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If seemings are pre-conceptual, they lack the propositional form needed to bear truth-values; if they are conceptual, they are already subject to the same fallibility as perceiving-that, collapsing the distinction.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The accuracy/truth distinction is merely terminological; both require content matching reality, so the dilemma's terms are false.
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    • 2.Pre-conceptual states can still possess representational content without explicit concept-deployment, undermining the excluded-middle framing.
      ?

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    • 3.Some seemings (e.g., gestalt organization) are conceptually structured yet epistemically more basic than propositional judgments.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Non-propositional states cannot be true or false, only accurate or inaccurate, preserving a real distinction from propositional judgment.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Conceptual content requires rational capacities and inferential roles that pre-conceptual seemings demonstrably lack empirically.
      ?

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    • 3.Collapsing seemings into perceiving-that eliminates the causal buffer explaining why seemings don't immediately constitute knowledge.
      ?

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