If substance is a formal concept stabilizing our conceptual scheme, rival schemes lacking substance-talk—such as process ontologies—would be conceptually incoherent, yet Whitehead's metaphysics demonstrates they need not be.
?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.
Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.
A Whitehead is most commonly **Alfred North Whitehead** (1861-1947), a British mathematician and philosopher who fundamentally shaped modern thought. He's famous for developing process philosophy, the idea that reality is made up of constantly changing events and relationships rather than static objects, and for co-writing an influential mathematics textbook called *Principia Mathematica*. His work bridges mathematics, logic, and philosophy, making him important for understanding how we think about everything from physics to metaphysics.
conceptual scheme(Śāntarakṣita's epistemology)
The linguistic and conceptual framework through which we talk about the world, as distinct from the world of particulars itself
metaphysics(Hartshorne's naturalistic redefinition of metaphysics)
On Hartshorne's view, the study not of realities beyond the physical, but of features of reality that are ubiquitous or that would exist in any possible world.
substance(Spinoza's metaphysics; criteria include (i) necessity and (ii) self-subsistence)
The fundamental existent that is wholly necessary and self-subsistent, not depending on anything else for its existence