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    Carmelics

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    Substance is a formal concept with a central structural r... — Carmelics
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    Substance is a formal concept with a central structural role in our conceptual scheme, not merely a name for certain important kinds of things in the world.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.In the Kantian framework, substance is necessary for the coherence of our conceptual scheme rather than being defined by the intrinsic nature of particular entities.
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    • 2.The role of substance is to give unity to our spatio-temporal framework and to enable individuation and re-identification of particulars.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Aristotle's hylomorphic substance is individuated by matter and form intrinsic to things, not by structural roles in any conceptual scheme.
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    • 2.If substance were merely formal, Aristotle's distinction between primary and secondary substance would collapse into a purely logical taxonomy.
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    • 3.The persistence of individual substances through accidental change is grounded in the thing's own nature, not in our epistemic requirements for re-identification.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's ontological relativity shows that what counts as a 'thing' is scheme-relative, undermining any claim that substance plays a uniquely privileged structural role.
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    • 2.If substance is a formal concept stabilizing our conceptual scheme, rival schemes lacking substance-talk—such as process ontologies—would be conceptually incoherent, yet Whitehead's metaphysics demonstrates they need not be.
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    Related

    Aristotle's hylomorphic substance is individuated by matter and form intrinsic t...If substance is a formal concept stabilizing our conceptual scheme, rival scheme...If substance were merely formal, Aristotle's distinction between primary and sec...In the Kantian framework, substance is necessary for the coherence of our concep...
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    Quine's ontological relativity shows that what counts as a 'thing' is scheme-rel...The persistence of individual substances through accidental change is grounded i...The role of substance is to give unity to our spatio-temporal framework and to e...

    Similar

    Space itself is a kind of conceptual abstraction rather than a real en...81%If concepts F and G are not materially equivalent, then F and G are di...77%In the Kantian framework, substance is necessary for the coherence of ...77%There is a primitive distinction between entities that are fundamental...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: substance
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    In the Kantian philosophy of P. F. Strawson (1959, 1966), this framework of necessity is taken in a more common-sense and realist spirit. The world must possess such enduring objects for it to be intelligible for us—indeed, for us to be part of it, for we are essentially stable bodies amongst other stable bodies. The important point for both Strawson and Kant is that there must be substances for there to be a coherent empirical, spatio-temporal world. Substance has become a formal concept of cen
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit