If the divine nature is a genuine universal shared by three Persons, it possesses ontological standing comparable to the Persons and cannot be reduced to a merely functional quasi-matter role.
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In Christian theology, the three distinct beings of the Trinity: the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each considered a 'Person' in a special theological sense.
divine nature(Distinguishes the divine nature from the three persons, which are compound substances)
A reality that is both a property and a simple (non-compound) substance, shared as the matter-constituent in each of the three divine persons
quasi-matter(in metaphysics)
Something that acts like physical material or stuff but isn't quite the same thing—a substance-like thing that isn't genuinely substantial.
reduced to(in philosophical analysis)
Explained away as being nothing more than something else; claiming something is really just a lesser or simpler version of something else.
universal(Argument for the generality of Turing machines)
A computing system capable of simulating any other computing system of the same or lesser power; used here to describe Turing machines as the most general model of computation.