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    If the identity theorist is right, explanatory pretension... — Carmelics
    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    If the identity theorist is right, explanatory pretensions about truth must be abandoned.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.On the identity theory, a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fact, and false otherwise.
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    • 2.Saying that a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fact does not say much of substance about truth.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Identity theories can retain explanatory power by grounding truth in the structural isomorphism between propositions and facts, not mere co-reference.
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    • 2.Moore and Russell's early identity theory explained truth's non-relational character precisely by collapsing the gap between truth-bearer and truth-maker.
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    • 3.Eliminating a redundant explanatory layer (the correspondence relation) can constitute theoretical economy, not explanatory abandonment.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that identity statements can carry substantive cognitive content, even when the relata are identical.
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    • 2.If 'the morning star is the evening star' is informative despite asserting identity, then 'a true proposition is a fact' can similarly be explanatorily substantive.
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    Topics

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Related

    Eliminating a redundant explanatory layer (the correspondence relation) can cons...Frege's distinction between sense and reference shows that identity statements c...Identity theories can retain explanatory power by grounding truth in the structu...If 'the morning star is the evening star' is informative despite asserting ident...
    +3 moreShow less
    Moore and Russell's early identity theory explained truth's non-relational chara...On the identity theory, a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fac...Saying that a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fact does not s...

    Similar

    Given the failure of (a), the identity theorist can contend that that ...81%A Russellian identity theorist is committed to the view that propositi...80%A Russellian identity theorist holds that declarative sentences refer ...80%If identity is necessary, a theory committed to Hesperus is automatica...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truth-identity
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    This line of argument can be strengthened by noting the following point about explanation. Correspondence theorists have typically wanted the relation of correspondence to explain truth: they have usually wanted to say that it is because the proposition that Socrates is wise corresponds to a fact that it is true, and because the proposition that Socrates is foolish—or rather: It is not the case that Socrates is wise (after all, his merely being foolish is not enough to guarantee that he is not w
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit