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    Saying that a proposition is true just if it is identical... — Carmelics
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    Supports→If the identity theorist is right, explanatory pretensions about truth must be abandoned.

    Saying that a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fact does not say much of substance about truth.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

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    If the identity theorist is right, explanatory pretensions about truth must be a...On the identity theory, a proposition is true just if it is identical with a fac...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    If propositions are facts (in Wittgensteinian spirit), then the propos...89%On a Wittgensteinian line, the false proposition that p being identica...87%If two propositions are identical, they have the same truth value in a...86%A false proposition is still identical with itself85%

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    This line of argument can be strengthened by noting the following point about explanation. Correspondence theorists have typically wanted the relation of correspondence to explain truth: they have usually wanted to say that it is because the proposition that Socrates is wise corresponds to a fact that it is true, and because the proposition that Socrates is foolish—or rather: It is not the case that Socrates is wise (after all, his merely being foolish is not enough to guarantee that he is not w

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