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    If the non-normative semantic base relation underdetermin... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they must show that semantics needs a normative construal, not merely that it could be given one.

    If the non-normative semantic base relation underdetermines which extensions are correct across novel cases, then normative construal is not merely optional but required to close the explanatory gap.

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    Key Terms

    Extensions(what FO allegedly cannot express according to the claim)
    In logic, the set of all things that a property actually applies to—for example, the extension of 'red things' is everything that is red.
    explanatory gap(Central concept in anti-physicalist arguments)
    The alleged in-principle inability to intelligibly explain how consciousness arises from physical processes
    non-normative semantic base relation(philosophy of language and meaning)
    The basic, objective meaning or connection between words and things—stripped of any ideas about how things should be or what we value.
    normative construal(epistemology and philosophy of language)
    Interpreting or understanding something by deciding what *should* be the case or what we *ought* to value, rather than just what *is* the case.

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    novel cases(philosophy of language and logic)
    New situations or examples that weren't part of the original information you had—cases you haven't seen before.
    underdetermines(logic and language)
    Doesn't fully decide or pin down; leaves open multiple possible interpretations because there isn't enough information visible to choose just one.

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    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedPhilosophy of Language1 linked

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    Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they mu...

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