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    Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a spe... — Carmelics
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    Normativists who appeal to Rosen's distinction face a special challenge: they must show that semantics needs a normative construal, not merely that it could be given one.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    Reasons For

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    • 1.These normativists grant that the basic semantic relation is non-normative.
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    • 2.If the basic semantic relation is non-normative, the relevant question shifts from whether semantic correctness could be given a normative construal to whether semantics needs such a construal.
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    Reasons Against

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    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Railton and other Cornell realists argue that functional-role explanations in semantics are explanatorily incomplete without appeal to normative standards that govern correct application.
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    • 2.If the non-normative semantic base relation underdetermines which extensions are correct across novel cases, then normative construal is not merely optional but required to close the explanatory gap.
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    • 3.Kripke's rule-following considerations show precisely that no purely descriptive fact fixes the unique correct projection of a rule, making normative supplementation a theoretical necessity, not a luxury.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Rosen's distinction between 'could be construed normatively' and 'needs a normative construal' presupposes a sharp metaphysical/conceptual divide that quietists like Wittgenstein deny is principled.
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    • 2.If normative and descriptive vocabularies are mutually irreducible but co-applicable to the same domain, then showing a normative construal is possible constitutes partial evidence that it is necessary for a complete semantic theory.
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    Related

    If normative and descriptive vocabularies are mutually irreducible but co-applic...If the basic semantic relation is non-normative, the relevant question shifts fr...If the non-normative semantic base relation underdetermines which extensions are...Kripke's rule-following considerations show precisely that no purely descriptive...
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    Railton and other Cornell realists argue that functional-role explanations in se...Rosen's distinction between 'could be construed normatively' and 'needs a normat...These normativists grant that the basic semantic relation is non-normative.

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    If the basic semantic relation is non-normative, the relevant question...86%These normativists grant that the basic semantic relation is non-norma...79%If the normativist and anti-normativist concepts of semantic correctne...78%The anti-normativist denies what the normativist asserts—that the conc...76%

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    SEP: meaning-normativity
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    This strand in the debate might seem to suggest that behind the discussion of the simple argument lies nothing but a basic clash of intuitions. The anti-normativist denies what the normativist asserts—that the concept of semantic correctness is an essentially normative concept. A possible conclusion, therefore, is that the normativist and the anti-normativist operate with different concepts of semantic correctness. This raises the question, however, whether there is nevertheless co-extensionalit
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    Details

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    3 (1 for, 2 against)
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