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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If the rules of recognition are coordination conventions, it is relatively easy to explain how they may give rise to obligations.

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    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Lewis-style conventions generate obligations only when defection produces coordination failure, but legal systems persist even when widely defied.
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    • 2.Hart himself distinguished between 'being obliged' (coerced) and 'having an obligation' (rule-governed), and mere convention collapses this distinction.
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    • 3.If the rule of recognition is merely conventional, officials who defect face no moral wrong—only social friction—making legal obligation indistinguishable from mere regularity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Raz's service conception entails that legitimate authority derives from expertise in pre-existing reasons, not from coordinating behavior around arbitrary focal points.
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    • 2.A coordination convention can obligate compliance with any consistent focal point, making the content of law morally arbitrary in ways incompatible with genuine legal obligation.
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    • 3.Shapiro's planning theory reveals that rules of recognition are constitutive of legal institutions, not solutions to antecedent problems, undermining the derivation of obligation from coordination.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Coordination conventions emerge as solutions to large-scale and recurrent coordination problems (Lewis 1969).
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    • 2.Norm subjects have an obligation to solve the coordination problem that gave rise to the relevant convention.
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    • 3.If the rules of recognition solve such a coordination problem, they inherit that obligatory force.
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