Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    If the rules of recognition are coordination conventions,... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    If the rules of recognition are coordination conventions, it is relatively easy to explain how they may give rise to obligations.

    Justice & PunishmentSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Coordination conventions emerge as solutions to large-scale and recurrent coordination problems (Lewis 1969).
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Norm subjects have an obligation to solve the coordination problem that gave rise to the relevant convention.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If the rules of recognition solve such a coordination problem, they inherit that obligatory force.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lewis-style conventions generate obligations only when defection produces coordination failure, but legal systems persist even when widely defied.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Hart himself distinguished between 'being obliged' (coerced) and 'having an obligation' (rule-governed), and mere convention collapses this distinction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If the rule of recognition is merely conventional, officials who defect face no moral wrong—only social friction—making legal obligation indistinguishable from mere regularity.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Raz's service conception entails that legitimate authority derives from expertise in pre-existing reasons, not from coordinating behavior around arbitrary focal points.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A coordination convention can obligate compliance with any consistent focal point, making the content of law morally arbitrary in ways incompatible with genuine legal obligation.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Shapiro's planning theory reveals that rules of recognition are constitutive of legal institutions, not solutions to antecedent problems, undermining the derivation of obligation from coordination.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentSocial Contract

    Connections

    1 topic

    Democracy & Governance1 linked

    Related

    A coordination convention can obligate compliance with any consistent focal poin...Coordination conventions emerge as solutions to large-scale and recurrent coordi...Hart himself distinguished between 'being obliged' (coerced) and 'having an obli...If the rule of recognition is merely conventional, officials who defect face no ...
    +5 moreShow less
    If the rules of recognition solve such a coordination problem, they inherit that...Lewis-style conventions generate obligations only when defection produces coordi...Norm subjects have an obligation to solve the coordination problem that gave ris...Raz's service conception entails that legitimate authority derives from expertis...Shapiro's planning theory reveals that rules of recognition are constitutive of ...

    Similar

    If the rules of recognition solve such a coordination problem, they in...90%The rules of recognition only define what the law is; they cannot sett...81%The rules of recognition cannot, by themselves, serve as sources of mo...79%Constitutive conventions do not derive their existence from a prior ob...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: lawphil-nature
    View source passageHide passage
    Explaining the rationale of legal authority, however, is not the only component of a theory about the normativity of law. If we hold the legal positivist thesis that law is essentially founded on social conventions, another important question arises here: how can a conventional practice give rise to reasons for action and, in particular, to obligations? Some legal philosophers claimed that conventional rules cannot, by themselves, give rise to obligations. As Leslie Green observed, Hart’s “view
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit