If the same person could have existed earlier under a different psychological continuity theory, then asymmetric indifference to earlier existence lacks metaphysical justification.

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Asymmetric indifference to earlier existence(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of time): The idea that we care differently about existing in the future than we care about existing in the past—we're often worried about dying but not bothered by the time before we were born.
Psychological continuity theory(as used in metaphysics and philosophy of personal identity): A theory about what makes you the same person over time—the idea that you're 'you' because your memories, personality, and mental patterns connect your past self to your present self.
justification(Third condition of the tripartite account of knowledge): The condition on a knower's belief that excludes mere luck — the belief must be held in a way that is appropriate or warranted, not merely accidentally correct.
metaphysical(Ayer's Logical Positivist usage): Language that purports to refer beyond the physical world and lacks empirical consequences, which Ayer classifies as not literally significant

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