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    It is entirely reasonable not to want to come into existe... — Carmelics
    Home/Afterlife & Death
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    It is entirely reasonable not to want to come into existence earlier even though we want to live longer.

    Afterlife & Death
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.It is metaphysically impossible for a person to have come into existence significantly earlier than she did.
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    • 2.It is possible for a person to have existed longer than she actually did.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Lucretius argued that prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are symmetrical, and our equanimity about the former should extend to the latter.
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    • 2.Nagel's asymmetry claim presupposes that deprivation of future goods is worse than deprivation of past goods, but this requires an independent argument beyond mere modal possibility.
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    • 3.Without such an argument, the asymmetry reflects psychological bias rather than a rational normative distinction, undermining the claim that the asymmetric attitude is 'entirely reasonable.'
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.If personal identity is grounded in psychological continuity rather than biological origin, earlier instantiation of the same psychology would constitute the same person.
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    • 2.If the same person could have existed earlier under a different psychological continuity theory, then asymmetric indifference to earlier existence lacks metaphysical justification.
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    Topics

    Afterlife & Death

    Related

    If personal identity is grounded in psychological continuity rather than biologi...If the same person could have existed earlier under a different psychological co...It is metaphysically impossible for a person to have come into existence signifi...It is possible for a person to have existed longer than she actually did.
    +3 moreShow less
    Lucretius argued that prenatal non-existence and posthumous non-existence are sy...Nagel's asymmetry claim presupposes that deprivation of future goods is worse th...Without such an argument, the asymmetry reflects psychological bias rather than ...

    Similar

    We do not want to have been born earlier (we do not want to have alway...89%It is not irrational to prefer that our lives be extended into the fut...79%We want to die later, or not at all, because it is a way of extending ...79%It is not irrational to want future life more than past life.78%

    Source

    AI-extracted2/3 agreementValid
    SEP: death
    Thomas Nagel, 'Death'
    View source passageHide passage
    In “Death” Thomas Nagel offered a response to Lucretius that has been widely discussed. It is entirely reasonable not to want to come into existence earlier even though we want to live longer, Nagel said, because it is metaphysically impossible for a person to have come into existence significantly earlier than she did, even though it is possible for a person to have existed longer than she actually did. However, his response hinges on questionable assumptions about the essential features of people’s origins, as Nagel acknowledges (in footnote 3 of the reprint of “Death” in his collection Mort...
    Extraction notes

    Validity: The passage explicitly attributes this argument to Nagel, stating he claimed it is "entirely reasonable not to want to come into existence earlier even though we want to live longer" precisely "because" of the asymmetry described in the two premises.

    Confidence: This is Nagel's argument as reported in the text.

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit