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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If the sensitivity requirement were accepted as a condition on knowledge, the closure principle would fail, undermining the first premise of the CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The CP-style argument for Cartesian Skepticism relies on the closure principle as a first premise
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    • 2.Accepting the sensitivity requirement entails that closure fails
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    • 3.If closure fails, the basis for the first premise of the CP-style skeptical argument is forfeited
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nozick's sensitivity condition (S wouldn't believe p if p were false) is independently motivated by tracking theories of knowledge.
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    • 2.Tracking theories explain lottery cases and perceptual knowledge without invoking closure, giving them epistemic credentials beyond anti-skeptical utility.
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    • 3.A condition with independent theoretical support can legitimately constrain which logical principles govern knowledge, including closure.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Dretske's relevant alternatives framework shows that knowing p requires ruling out only alternatives relevant to p's context, not all logically possible alternatives.
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    • 2.If knowledge is context-sensitive in Dretske's sense, then knowing 'I have hands' does not transmit via closure to knowing 'I am not a BIV', since BIV scenarios are irrelevant alternatives in ordinary contexts.
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    • 3.The failure of closure under Dretske's framework is thus not an ad hoc rescue but a principled consequence of an independently developed epistemological theory.
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