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    If two atomic propositions can be inconsistent, there are... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The Tractatus view that all necessities are logical necessities is wrong.

    If two atomic propositions can be inconsistent, there are necessities that are not reducible to logical (tautological) form.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    The Tractatus view that all necessities are logical necessities is wrong.Two atomic propositions can be mutually inconsistent.

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    Two atomic propositions can be mutually inconsistent.86%The Tractatus view that atomic propositions are logically independent ...83%On the Tractatus view, unanalyzable (atomic) propositions should be lo...78%Two propositions formally imply a contradiction only if they cannot be...78%

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    Wittgenstein: A Critique reviews the Tractatus, the Blue and Brown books, Remarks on the Foundations of the Mathematics, and the Investigations. The format is to take key aphorisms from Wittgenstein, expound them at considerable length, and then launch objections, which pile up as in a Thomistic Summa, but absent the replies. For example, against the Tractatus, Findlay objects (1) “Ultimate simple objects” are not ontologically viable, whatever can be referred to must have an internal structure,

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