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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If we have good reason to believe that p is true and good reason to believe that q is true, then we have good reason to believe that p and q are logically consistent, even without understanding how they could be mutually consistent.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Apparent good reasons for p and q can both be defeated when their conjunction entails an absurdity, as Frege's Basic Law V illustrates.
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    • 2.When p and q jointly entail a contradiction, the correct response is to revise one belief, not infer their consistency from separate warrant.
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    • 3.The inference from 'separately warranted' to 'jointly consistent' is precisely what Russell's paradox showed to be illegitimate in set theory.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.The Zeno analogy fails because motion's possibility was never seriously doubted on theological grounds, whereas divine simplicity faces internal conceptual incoherence claims.
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    • 2.Epistemic access to actualized states of affairs grounds possibility claims, but divine simplicity's conjunction with divine personhood is not observationally accessible in any analogous sense.
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    • 3.Plantinga and Alvin argued that some theological conjunctions generate modal collapse, making the consistency question irreducible to mere epistemic confidence.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.What is actual is possible whether or not one can render intelligible how it is possible.
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    • 2.Motion is actual, hence possible, despite one's inability in the teeth of Zenonian considerations to understand how it is possible.
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    • 3.Many similar examples could be given.
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    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.