Statements: 321,452
Perspectives: 108,905
Topics: 42

If we have good reason to believe that p is true and good reason to believe that q is true, then we have good reason to believe that p and q are logically consistent, even without understanding how they could be mutually consistent.

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1 reason for

2 reasons against

Reasons For

1 perspective

Reason for

1.What is actual is possible whether or not one can render intelligible how it is possible.
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2.Motion is actual, hence possible, despite one's inability in the teeth of Zenonian considerations to understand how it is possible.
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3.Many similar examples could be given.
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Reasons Against

2 perspectives

Reason against 1 of 2

1.Apparent good reasons for p and q can both be defeated when their conjunction entails an absurdity, as Frege's Basic Law V illustrates.
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2.When p and q jointly entail a contradiction, the correct response is to revise one belief, not infer their consistency from separate warrant.
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3.The inference from 'separately warranted' to 'jointly consistent' is precisely what Russell's paradox showed to be illegitimate in set theory.
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Reason against 2 of 2

1.The Zeno analogy fails because motion's possibility was never seriously doubted on theological grounds, whereas divine simplicity faces internal conceptual incoherence claims.
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2.Epistemic access to actualized states of affairs grounds possibility claims, but divine simplicity's conjunction with divine personhood is not observationally accessible in any analogous sense.
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3.Plantinga and Alvin argued that some theological conjunctions generate modal collapse, making the consistency question irreducible to mere epistemic confidence.
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Topics

Divine Attributes

Key Terms

Mutually consistent(in logic): When a set of beliefs don't contradict each other; they can all be true at the same time without logical conflict.
good reason to believe(as used in epistemology (the study of knowledge and belief)): Having solid evidence or logical support for thinking something is true, even if you're not 100% certain.
logically consistent(as used in logic and reasoning): Two statements are logically consistent if they can both be true at the same time without creating a contradiction.
p and q(as used in logical reasoning): In logic, these are just placeholder letters representing statements or claims that could be true or false—like how you might use x and y in algebra.

Apparent good reasons for p and q can both be defeated when their conjunction en...Epistemic access to actualized states of affairs grounds possibility claims, but...Many similar examples could be given.Motion is actual, hence possible, despite one's inability in the teeth of Zenoni...

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Plantinga and Alvin argued that some theological conjunctions generate modal col...The Zeno analogy fails because motion's possibility was never seriously doubted ...The inference from 'separately warranted' to 'jointly consistent' is precisely w...

Source

AI-extracted

SEP: divine-simplicity

View source passage

One can see from the foregoing that Plantinga-type objections are not compelling. The reason, again, is that DDS cannot be made sense of within a nonconstituent ontology. It can be made sense of, assuming it can be made sense of, only within a constituent ontology, the style of ontology presupposed by its main defender, Aquinas. A nonconstituent ontologist like Plantinga may be represented as arguing by Modus Ponens: If God exemplifies his nature, then he is distinct from it; God exemplifies his nature; ergo, God is distinct from his nature, and DDS is false. But the constituent ontologist is...

Details

Type: claim
Perspectives: 3 (1 for, 2 against)
Edits: 1 edit