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    If whether Humphrey could have won the election depends o... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→De re modal assertions about an object are semantically equivalent to assertions about that object's counterparts in other possible worlds.

    If whether Humphrey could have won the election depends on which counterpart relation is operative, then de re modal truths about Humphrey lack determinate truth conditions, which Chisholm's modal essentialism explicitly rejects.

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    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Counterpart theory makes truth-conditions depend on conventional choices about identity criteria, which are not determinate facts about Humphrey.
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    • 2.Modal essentialism requires that facts about what is essential to Humphrey obtain independently of which relation we use to track him across worlds.
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    • 3.If the same proposition's truth varies with different but equally legitimate counterpart relations, then that proposition lacks determinate truth conditions.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The 'right' counterpart relation may be determinate even if multiple relations are metaphysically possible, just as the actual world is determinate despite possible worlds.
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    • 2.Indeterminacy about which relation is operative doesn't entail indeterminacy about truth-conditions if the truth-value is the same under all admissible relations.
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    • 3.Chisholm could accept that truth-conditions depend on facts about counterpart relations without abandoning essentialism about Humphrey's intrinsic properties.
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    Key Terms

    Chisholm(as a philosopher being cited)
    Roderick Chisholm, an important 20th-century American philosopher who argued for essentialism (the view that things have properties they must have).
    De re(in modal logic and metaphysics)
    A Latin phrase meaning 'about the thing itself'; it refers to a statement about what must be true of a specific person or object no matter what.
    Determinate truth conditions(in logic and philosophy of language)
    Clear, definite rules that decide whether a statement is true or false—without this, you can't tell if something is actually true.
    Humphrey(as a historical reference in modal logic discussions)
    Hubert Humphrey, a real politician who almost won the 1968 U.S. presidential election; philosophers use him as an example when discussing whether things could have turned out differently.
    counterpart relation(Used by counterpart theorists to interpret de re modal claims.)
    A relation based on resemblance that, unlike identity, is not transitive.
    modal(in logic and metaphysics)
    Dealing with possibility and necessity—questions about what could be true, what must be true, and what's merely contingent (could go either way).
    modal essentialism(Presented as a coarser-grained alternative to Aristotelian essentialism)
    The view that a property is essential to a kind if and only if it is a necessary property of that kind

    Connections

    1 topic

    Modality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    Chisholm could accept that truth-conditions depend on facts about counterpart re...Counterpart theory makes truth-conditions depend on conventional choices about i...De re modal assertions about an object are semantically equivalent to assertions...If the same proposition's truth varies with different but equally legitimate cou...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    2 (1 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit
    +3 moreShow less
    Indeterminacy about which relation is operative doesn't entail indeterminacy abo...Modal essentialism requires that facts about what is essential to Humphrey obtai...The 'right' counterpart relation may be determinate even if multiple relations a...