Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    De re modal assertions about an object are semantically e... — Carmelics
    Home/Modality & Possibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    De re modal assertions about an object are semantically equivalent to assertions about that object's counterparts in other possible worlds.

    Modality & Possibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.An object y in world w2 is a counterpart of object x in world w1 if y resembles x and nothing else in w2 resembles x more than y.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Each object is its own counterpart in the world it inhabits but typically differs in important ways from its other-worldly counterparts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Sentences making de re assertions about what an object might have done or could or could not have been are unpacked semantically as sentences about that object's counterparts in other possible worlds.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's direct reference theory establishes that proper names are rigid designators that pick out the same individual across all possible worlds.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If 'Aristotle' rigidly designates the same individual in every world, then de re modal claims about Aristotle concern that very individual, not numerically distinct counterparts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Counterpart theory substitutes a different individual for the original object, making it a theory of de dicto similarity, not genuine de re modality about the object itself.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The counterpart relation is vague and context-sensitive, varying with which properties are deemed salient for resemblance in a given conversational context.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If whether Humphrey could have won the election depends on which counterpart relation is operative, then de re modal truths about Humphrey lack determinate truth conditions, which Chisholm's modal essentialism explicitly rejects.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.Genuine de re modality requires that modal properties belong to objects essentially and non-relatively, not relative to an arbitrarily chosen similarity metric.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.

    Topics

    Modality & Possibility

    Related

    An object y in world w2 is a counterpart of object x in world w1 if y resembles ...Counterpart theory substitutes a different individual for the original object, m...Each object is its own counterpart in the world it inhabits but typically differ...Genuine de re modality requires that modal properties belong to objects essentia...
    +5 moreShow less
    If 'Aristotle' rigidly designates the same individual in every world, then de re...If whether Humphrey could have won the election depends on which counterpart rel...Kripke's direct reference theory establishes that proper names are rigid designa...Sentences making de re assertions about what an object might have done or could ...The counterpart relation is vague and context-sensitive, varying with which prop...

    Similar

    If modal statements do not require grounding in possible individuals o...83%Relativism about epistemic modals holds that propositions can differ i...83%De re modal truths are grounded in facts about counterparts, not in a ...82%Propositions expressed by epistemic modal sentences can vary in truth-...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: possible-worlds
    View source passageHide passage
    In fact, Lewis whole-heartedly accepts that things have accidental properties and, indeed, would accept that (16) is robustly true. His explanation involves one of the most interesting and provocative elements of his theory: the doctrine of counterparts. Roughly, an object y in a world w2 is a counterpart of an object x in w1 if y resembles x and nothing else in w2 resembles x more than y.[19] Each object is thus its own (not necessarily unique) counterpart in the world it inhabits
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit