Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that If x has a part that instantiates F and a part that instantiates G, and F and G are incompatible properties, then x is not simple.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.A being can instantiate incompatible properties across different relations or respects without those properties inhering in numerically distinct parts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The Trinity doctrine, as developed by Aquinas in Summa Theologiae I.39, holds that real distinctions of relation are compatible with absolute simplicity of substance.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If incompatible properties are grounded in relational distinctions rather than mereological ones, P1 of the supporting argument fails to establish numerical distinctness of parts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Divine simplicity, as articulated by Augustine and later Plotinus, holds that in God essence and attribute are identical, collapsing the predicate-property distinction that underlies the claim.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If F and G are not properties inhering in a subject but are identical with the divine essence viewed under different descriptions, then instantiating both F and G entails no mereological commitment.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The claim's logical force presupposes a hylomorphic or bundle-theoretic ontology of property instantiation that a pure act theorist is under no obligation to accept.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If x has a part that instantiates F and a part that instantiates G, and F and G are incompatible properties, then the parts instantiating F and G are not identical.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If the parts instantiating F and G are not identical, then x has at least two parts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.If x has at least two parts, then at least one of those parts is a proper part of x.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.