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    Imagining believing is implemented by the reuse of the be... — Carmelics
    Home/Consciousness & Mind
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Imagining believing is implemented by the reuse of the belief-forming mechanism (satisfying condition b.ii).

    Consciousness & Mind
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    2 reasons against

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Belief-like imaginings have the same type of content as genuine beliefs and a functional role similar to genuine beliefs.
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    • 2.A plausible explanation for belief-like imaginings being belief-like is that both are generated by the same cognitive mechanism.
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    • 3.The mind contains a belief-forming mechanism responsible for generating beliefs.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Belief-forming mechanisms are constitutively tied to truth-tracking functions that imagination systematically suspends, suggesting distinct rather than shared mechanisms.
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    • 2.If the same mechanism generated both beliefs and imaginings, the phenomenological and functional quarantine between them—documented by Currie and Ravenscroft—would require additional unexplained inhibitory machinery, undermining parsimony claims.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Neural reuse, as argued by Anderson, demonstrates that overlapping neural substrates need not imply shared computational mechanisms—the same tissue can implement functionally distinct processes.
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    • 2.Shared neural implementation is insufficient evidence for the reuse of a single belief-forming mechanism, since functionally distinct systems can be co-implemented in overlapping cortical regions.
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    Topics

    Consciousness & Mind

    Connections

    1 linked claim

    Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.ii) in that it is implemented by reus...

    Related

    A plausible explanation for belief-like imaginings being belief-like is that bot...Belief-forming mechanisms are constitutively tied to truth-tracking functions th...Belief-like imaginings have the same type of content as genuine beliefs and a fu...Cognitive mechanisms are evolutionarily costly to build and maintain.
    +8 moreShow less
    Evolution may adopt the parsimonious strategy of redeploying a pre-existing mech...If the same mechanism generated both beliefs and imaginings, the phenomenologica...Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.ii) in that it is implemented by reus...Neural reuse is one of the fundamental organizational principles of the brain.Neural reuse, as argued by Anderson, demonstrates that overlapping neural substr...Shared neural implementation is insufficient evidence for the reuse of a single ...Some mechanism must be responsible for generating belief-like imaginings.

    Similar

    Imagining believing satisfies condition (b.ii) in that it is implement...97%The mind contains a belief-forming mechanism responsible for generatin...81%Some mechanism must be responsible for generating belief-like imaginin...80%Having beliefs requires possessing the concept of belief.76%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: folkpsych-simulation
    View source passageHide passage
    What about (b.ii)? Direct evidence bearing on it is scarce. However, Simulation Theorists can give an argument along the following lines. First, one owes an explanation of why belief-like imaginings are, well, belief-like—as we have said above, it seems that they have the same type of content as, and a functional role similar to, genuine beliefs. A possible explanation for this is that both types of mental states are generated by (cognitive processes implemented by) the same cognitive mechanism.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    The mind contains a belief-forming mechanism responsible for generating beliefs.
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit