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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Imagining believing is implemented by the reuse of the belief-forming mechanism (satisfying condition b.ii).

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Belief-forming mechanisms are constitutively tied to truth-tracking functions that imagination systematically suspends, suggesting distinct rather than shared mechanisms.
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    • 2.If the same mechanism generated both beliefs and imaginings, the phenomenological and functional quarantine between them—documented by Currie and Ravenscroft—would require additional unexplained inhibitory machinery, undermining parsimony claims.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Neural reuse, as argued by Anderson, demonstrates that overlapping neural substrates need not imply shared computational mechanisms—the same tissue can implement functionally distinct processes.
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    • 2.Shared neural implementation is insufficient evidence for the reuse of a single belief-forming mechanism, since functionally distinct systems can be co-implemented in overlapping cortical regions.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Belief-like imaginings have the same type of content as genuine beliefs and a functional role similar to genuine beliefs.
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    • 2.A plausible explanation for belief-like imaginings being belief-like is that both are generated by the same cognitive mechanism.
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    • 3.The mind contains a belief-forming mechanism responsible for generating beliefs.
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