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    Impossible falsehood of ¬φ does not imply necessary truth... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The standard definition of possibility (◇φ ≡ ¬□¬φ) fails under the Gap principle

    Impossible falsehood of ¬φ does not imply necessary truth of φ when φ is not statable in some worlds

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

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    But □Hb (Bergoglio is necessarily human) does not follow, because 'Hb' is also n...The standard definition of possibility (◇φ ≡ ¬□¬φ) fails under the Gap principleTherefore '¬Hb' is not true in any world, so ¬◇¬Hb holds

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    Under Gap, in worlds where Bergoglio does not exist, '¬Hb' (Bergoglio is not hum...

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    A statement φ can fail to be false in all worlds (because it is not st...89%For φ to be necessarily true, the proposition φ expresses must necessa...84%Therefore the correct definition of necessity requires both that φ cou...82%It would be wrong to say that, in a possible world where it is false t...81%

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    The logical implications of Gap are dramatic. Note first that the usual interdefinability of necessity and possibility fails. To see this for the particular case of SQML’s \(\Diamond\textbf{Def}\), consider, say, the obvious truth that Bergoglio is not a subatomic particle—say, a proton, \(\neg \sfP\sfb\). Since Bergoglio is a contingent being, there are worlds where he doesn’t exist. Hence, there are worlds where \(\neg \sfP\sfb\) fails to be statable and thus, by Gap, where it is neither tru

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