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    Carmelics

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    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that In the final round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational players will defect.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Rational agents can pre-commit to conditional strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat) that make cooperation the utility-maximizing choice across all rounds.
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    • 2.Backward induction assumes rationality is common knowledge, but Kreps et al. (1982) show that even slight uncertainty about opponent type unravels this assumption.
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    • 3.If defection in the final round is foreseen, the penultimate round collapses similarly—yet empirically, cooperation persists, suggesting the model misdescribes rational agency.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Kantian agents reason from universalizable maxims: if universal defection produces worse outcomes than universal cooperation, defection fails the categorical imperative.
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    • 2.A rational Kantian asks what rule all players should follow, not what move maximizes individual utility given others' anticipated defection.
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    • 3.P2 of the supporting argument presupposes narrowly instrumental rationality, which Korsgaard and others argue is not the only coherent conception of practical reason.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.In the final round, no future punishment for defection is possible.
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    • 2.Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punishment.
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