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    In the final round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dile... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    In the final round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational players will defect.

    Consequentialism
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.In the final round, no future punishment for defection is possible.
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    • 2.Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punishment.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Rational agents can pre-commit to conditional strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat) that make cooperation the utility-maximizing choice across all rounds.
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    • 2.Backward induction assumes rationality is common knowledge, but Kreps et al. (1982) show that even slight uncertainty about opponent type unravels this assumption.
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    • 3.If defection in the final round is foreseen, the penultimate round collapses similarly—yet empirically, cooperation persists, suggesting the model misdescribes rational agency.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kantian agents reason from universalizable maxims: if universal defection produces worse outcomes than universal cooperation, defection fails the categorical imperative.
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    • 2.A rational Kantian asks what rule all players should follow, not what move maximizes individual utility given others' anticipated defection.
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    • 3.P2 of the supporting argument presupposes narrowly instrumental rationality, which Korsgaard and others argue is not the only coherent conception of practical reason.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

    1 topic

    Justice & Punishment1 linked

    Related

    A rational Kantian asks what rule all players should follow, not what move maxim...Backward induction assumes rationality is common knowledge, but Kreps et al. (19...If defection in the final round is foreseen, the penultimate round collapses sim...In the final round, no future punishment for defection is possible.
    +4 moreShow less
    Kantian agents reason from universalizable maxims: if universal defection produc...P2 of the supporting argument presupposes narrowly instrumental rationality, whi...Rational agents can pre-commit to conditional strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat) tha...Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punis...

    Similar

    In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,...98%Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens...80%In the final round, no future punishment for defection is possible.78%Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the second-to-last...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    There are two complications. First, the players must be uncertain as to when their interaction ends. Suppose the players know when the last round comes. In that round, it will be utility-maximizing for players to defect, since no punishment will be possible. Now consider the second-last round. In this round, players also face no punishment for defection, since they expect to defect in the last round anyway. So they defect in the second-last round. But this means they face no threat of punishment
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit