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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Inductive logic should not presuppose the truth of contingent statements.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Carnap's inductive logic legitimately treats logical truths as having confirmation value 1, establishing that not all a priori constraints on support functions undermine evidential sensitivity.
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    • 2.The prohibition on presupposing contingent truths conflates the object-language content of hypotheses with the meta-level structural constraints that define a coherent probability space.
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    • 3.A support function can encode background regularities as framework principles without assigning them probability 1 relative to empirical evidence, as Carnap's lambda-continuum demonstrates.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Quine's holism entails that no sharp boundary exists between analytic framework constraints and contingent empirical commitments, making the presupposition prohibition indeterminate in scope.
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    • 2.If all epistemic frameworks carry some contingent commitments, then demanding presupposition-free inductive logic sets an unrealizable standard that condemns all systematized inference, not merely defective instances.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If a support function assigns degree 1 to a contingent statement C on all possible evidence, then no evidence can count against C.
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    • 2.A logic that allows no evidence against a contingent statement fails to measure the extent to which premises indicate the likely truth-values of conclusions.
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    • 3.The purpose of inductive logic is to provide a measure of the extent to which premise statements indicate the likely truth-values of contingent conclusion statements.
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